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GEORGE BERKELEY ON MORAL DEMONSTRATION
BY GRAHAM

P.

CONROY

In the Philosophical Commentaries, his personal notebooks, which
he was writing while still a student at Trinity College, Dublin, George
Berkeley made the entry:
Three sorts of useful knowledge-that of Coexistence, to be treated of in
our Principles of Natural Philosophy; that of Relation, in Mathematics;
that of Definition, or inclusion, or words (which perhaps differs not from
that of relation), in Morality. 1

Taking his cue from John Locke, whose Essay Concerning Human
Understanding was being used as a philosophy text in his college
classes, the young Berkeley saw an apparent similarity between the
methods of proofs in mathematics and in morality, which should be
called more properly demonstration than proof; for XVIth- and
XVIIth-century philosophers had made a distinction between proofs
and demonstrations. For example, Descartes took the experiencing of
sense objects by our minds as proof of an external world, inasmuch as
this experience was given to us even against our own acts of will or
certainly independently of them. This proof did not carry the same
measure of certainty for the Cartesians that a demonstration from
self-evident rational principles could have given. But this latter was
impossible since Descartes' Augustinian voluntarism ruled out a
knowledge of God's intentions and acts. Thus any logical necessity or
self-evidence in the observations of nature were precluded, for God
could at any moment alter the ordered course of nature if he so chose.
Professor Adamson of the University of Glasgow has written in
his article "Demonstration" in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy
and Psychology:
The term demonstration does not appear to have become a current accepted
equivalent [of the Aristotelian apodeixis] till the period of the Arabic
writers on logic, who translated &7r68E~i" by it. The earlier Latin use, as in
Boethius, does not go beyond the etymological sense, of showing, bringing
before the mind as if pointed to, which the term still retains even in its
specialized acceptation. For it is the peculiarity of demonstration that it
claims for the conclusion reached by a mediating process the same simple
absolute certainty that we incline to allow, without question, to the direct
apprehension of a fact. The fundamental problems regarding demonstration
begin in English philosophy with Locke's assignment of relations among
abstract ideas of demonstration, and contrast of them with matters of
fact ....2
1 Philosophical Commentaries, entry 853, included in vol. I of Works of George
Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne, ed. by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (London, 1948).
2 R. Adamson in Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, ed. by James Mark
Baldwin (New York, 1918), I, 268-269.
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Although the problem in its use originated with Locke and his
particular way of ideas, the demonstration of moral truth had been a
distinguishing feature of the XVIIth century. This was particularly
true of the Cambridge Platonists. To Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, morality was "immutable and eternal" and its basic precepts
were to be discovered in rerum natura by a wise employment of
reason. In 1731, just one year before Berkeley published his
Alciphron, Cudworth's Eternal and Immutable Morality appeared
posthumously. Previously these notions had been treated in More's
Enchiridion Ethicum and in Cudworth's True Intellectual System of
the Universe. In fact, almost every XVIIth-century philosopher believed in the mathematical treatment of ethics. Among the earlier
examples of the technique had been Spinoza's Ethica Ordine
Geometrico and Arnold Geulincx's Ethica.
The origin and growth of a demonstrative method is in itself instructive. Descartes' influence was still strong as a founder of mathematical sciences and this, coupled with a desire of many moralists to
divorce ethics from theological dogmatics, led to the general tendency
of XVIIth-century thinkers to seek a mathematical system of ethics.
The only alternative which the XVIIIth-century moralist saw open
to him were an uncritical acceptance of dogmatic theological pronouncements or a theological utilitarianism such as that espoused by
William Paley on the one hand or the adoption of a demonstration
of immutable moral precepts on the other. It is this latter type of
ethical doctrine which was most influential upon Locke. J. A. Passmore has pointed out the impact of Cudworth's thinking upon Locke, 3
and W. von Leyden, the editor of Locke's Essays on the Law of
Nature, has shown that of Nathaniel Culverwell and Bishop Cumberland.4 In addition to the Platonist influence, however, there is that of
John Wilkins, Bishop of Chester, Warden of Wadham College, and
one of the founders of the Royal Society.
In his Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion Wilkins
distinguished among three kinds of certainty which he named
Physical, Mathematical, and Moral Certainty, all else being relegated
to the realm of probability. Physical certainty depended upon the
evidence of sense, "which is the first and highest Kind of Evidence of
which human Nature is capable." 5 Mathematical certainty he held as
applying to mathematical things primarily without excluding other
matters which might be capable of a like certainty, viz. "all such
simple abstracted beings as in their own Natures do lie so open, and
3 See J. A. Passmore's Ralph Cudworth, An Interpretation (Cambridge, 1951).
Chapter VII, "Cudworth and the British Moralists,'' 90-106.
4 See W. von Leyden's John Locke's Essays on the Law of Nature, Latin text
with tr. (Oxford, 1954), 39 et seq.
5 John Wilkins, Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (9th ed., London, 1734), 5.
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are so obvious to the Understanding, that every Man's Judgment
(though never so much prejudiced) must necessarily assent to
them." 6 Moral certainty is that whose evidence is not of the same
kind as of the former, but is such as to necessitate the assent of
everyone though there be no natural necessity that such things must
be so else a contrary state of affairs involve a contradiction. The
mark of their assent is that no one can "admit of any reasonable
doubt concerning them." 7 But to expect demonstrative certainty in
moral matters was not possible for Wilkins as it had not been for
Aristotle, for "Moral things, which being not of such simple abstracted Natures, but depending upon m-ixed circumstances, are not
therefore capable of such kinds of demonstrative Proofs." 8 Men must
accept a statement or a conclusion as true on its own proper evidence
or else nothing will be believed except that which has the highest
evidence and all else will be uncertain or doubtful, and hence impossible of being known. Further, it was his belief that all conclusions
deduced from first principles established on these grounds would
possess the same degree of certainty as in the original principles.
But Locke wanted to go further; there was a basic unresolved
tension between his Scholastic training at Oxford and the empirical
direction of his thought. For him there was only demonstrative
knowledge and intuitive knowledge (such as that of the self), and
against this degrees of probability. If ethics was to be a 'science' in
the Platonic-Scholastic meaning of 'science,' it must be composed of a
body of demonstrably certain propositions. The way to this and over
Wilkin's objections was to show that in spite of the mixed circumstances in which moral problems occurred, their demonstration could
be rendered simple by illustrating that moral names were framed by
men apart from real things and applied to situations, and thus are
not signs for unknowable real essences as are the names of substances. The names of substances are the nominal essences men form
from the real things but which cannot designate them since we have
no knowledge of all the basic atomic, or corpuscularian internal relations of the substances being named. Therefore Locke thinks his way
to a 'science of ethics' leads through the identification of real and
nominal essence in moral ideas.
Both Locke and Berkeley were for certainty in knowledge and in
this sense were heirs to the Platonic and Scholastic tradition while at
the same time disavowing it. "Knowledge" was only that which was
certain. Probabilities were not real knowledge; they were only "probable truths." Two sciences qualified for Locke as possessing this "certain knowledge." These were mathematics and ethics. Physics only
possessed probable truths. Both mathematics and ethics consisted of
perfectly demonstrable propositions. Both deal with complex ideas
o Ibid., 6.

1

Ibid., 7.

s Ibid., 21.
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which are their own archetypes rather than with simple ideas which
always point, as their archetypes, to external objects, that is to say,
deal only with those abstract ideas Locke calls "mixed modes and relations." Ethics, treating as it does of abstract ideas only, becomes a
purely abstract science; and to the moral philosopher it would make
no difference whether or not a just act anywhere or at any time ever
existed. Such a view is completely foreign to Berkeley's insistence on
the parallels between theory and practice in his ethical writings and
alien to his general views on abstract ideas.
Locke had said, "I doubt not but from self-evident propositions
by the necessary consequences as incontestable as those in mathematics the measures of right and wrong might be made out" and that
such an interpretation as his might place "morality amongst the
sciences capable of demonstration." 9
Berkeley's entries in the Philosophical Commentaries show that
in ethics as well as in metaphysics he was greatly influenced by Locke.
These entries cannot be properly understood without reference to
Locke. To appreciate and evaluate the meaning of these entries, it is
necessary to have Locke's 'theory' of ethics in mind.
Now Locke had demonstrated, he believed, that mathematics was
distinct from natural science and held that certainty was possible in
the first case but not in the second since the object of the former was,
in his estimation, a mode whose real essence is one with its nominal
essence. Mathematics proceeded syntactically; it was a matter of
discovering the necessary connections between the terms the exact
definitions of which one knew. In like manner, Locke concluded, morality should be constructed as a demonstrative science since its objects-the abstract ideas of justice, right, fortitude, etc.-were also
modes whose real and nominal essences coincided. Therefore, truth
in both mathematics and morality should be independent of actual
experience and to that extent a priori. Correspondences in language
will have for him a corresponding relationship in the world of reality.
"If it be true in speculation, that is, in idea that murder deserves
death, it will also be true of any action that exists conformable to
that idea of murder." 10
Locke regarded his science of morality more difficult to axiomatize
than the science of mathematics because the abstract ideas involved
had only words for their symbols, possessing no further sensible signs.
Conversely, mathematical questions utilize both since in geometrical
demonstrations one may have both the word 'triangle' and the plane
figure on paper. Moral concepts, being conveyed by words, only allow
a greater possibility of confusion in their use. Nonetheless, if one is
careful in applying these more complex notions, an exact science of
morals actually can be achieved. Such was Locke's belief.
9

Essay Concerning Human Understanding, IV, III, 18.

10

Ibid., IV, 8.
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That Berkeley's early view on a science of morality is not dissimilar to that of Locke can be seen from the following entry from the
Commentaries: "Morality may be Demonstrated as mixt Mathematics." 11 Later entries show Berkeley's position changing. He realizes that this type of demonstration does no more than inform us how
people in a society have used words and in a lexicon fashion tell us
which words include which. 12 This tells us nothing of the foundations
of morality. It can only render an account of how at a given time people do indeed use language.
This is an advance upon his earlier stand in the Commentaries
when he thought that morality was capable of rigorous demonstration. Ethics on Lockian terms, like mathematics, will be a priori and
certain, but will be at the same time vacuous or tautologous. If one
gives the proper definitions of moral terms, he can never err in deducing moral judgments. This Berkeley apparently believed at first
and held that mathematics was easier to demonstrate than morals
only because the "words in Metaphisiques & Morality being mostly
known to all the definitions of them may chance to be controverted." 13
Before long, however, Berkeley came to see the absurdity of this
kind of extreme rationalism and the "trifling nature of Locke's propositions." 14 Such propositions merely informed one of how a man
intended to use moral terms. It has been said that Locke felt he was
not dealing with descriptive words that functioned vacuously in
purely syntactical contexts, but with actual ideas. His science of morality, nevertheless, even though it be allowed this provision, would
fail to provide an empirical 'science of morality' as Locke conceived
it. It would not be empirical since there are no ideas of sensation or
reflection of the moral terms and non-deductive since empirical reference would have to be made for such a 'science' to be significant.
Berkeley delivers a telling blow to this type of demonstration when
he says, "fruitless the distinction twixt real and nominal essence." 15
If this were all one wanted to know and nothing more, then Berkeley's blunt assertion, "To demonstrate morality it seems one need
only make a dictionary of words and see which included which," 16
would spell the end of the matter. But he sees the trifling nature of
the whole procedure. All statements that issue from definitions will
be vacuous since tautologous; the definitions will tell us how the
demonstrator uses words. It is not a "necessary truth" that the logical
Philosophical Commentaries, entry 755.
Ibid., entry 690. This type of work was attempted prior to Locke by Wilkins,
Bishop of Chester, in his book An Essay Toward a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language (London, 1668). It was commissioned by the Royal Society (see
1 4 Ibid., entry 691.
1s Ibid., entry 162.
Sprat's History).
1 5 Ibid., entry 536.
10 Ibid., entry 690.
11
12

This content downloaded from 131.252.181.104 on Mon, 18 Apr 2016 21:16:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

210

GRAHAM P. CONROY

order and the order of reality must in any way duplicate each other.
Yet in a paper written after the Essay, Locke appears to take a
position more in keeping with the tone of Berkeley. In this paper, Of
Ethics in General, Locke deprecates a moral theory that concerns itself merely with the analysis of moral terms, for ethics should consider
species of action in the world, as justice, temperance, and fortitude, drunkenness and theft. But all the knowledge of virtues and vices which a man
attained to this way would amount to no more than taking the definitions
of the significations to the words of any language, either from men skilled
in that language or the common usage of the country, to know how to apply
them and call particular actions in that country by their right names, and
so in effect would be no more but the skill how to speak properly.... The
end and use of morality being to direct our lives and by showing us what
actions are good, and what bad, prepare us to do the one and avoid the
other; those that pretend to teach morals mistake their business and become
only language masters. 1 7

It is this type of stigma, that of being a "language master," of
manipulating terms and framing meaningless and empty abstract
ideas that Berkeley directs against his predecessor. It is probable that
the statement in this later paper is not a volte-face for Locke, a repudiation of his 'science of morality'; for he had held he wasn't dealing with mere terms but with real ideas as well. Such a possible defense would have been untenable on at least two grounds, however.
First, even though they (demonstrations) dealt with ideas, such ideas
should be some kind of empirically derived abstractions if his earliest
account of language and ideas in the Essay is to give him a consistent
empiricism. But Locke specifically denies himself this escape by holding moral terms to have no symbols representing them other than
names, no other sensible symbols, hence, no ideas-certainly not of
sensation and not even of reflection. Second, any reference to empirical grounding of definitions would not properly be within the
scope of the 'science of morality' as Locke conceived it.
Thus, Locke's rationalism will prove his undoing. Either Berkeley
can reject his intended moral science as a web of empty tautologies
which say nothing about the world and the actual habits of human
beings; or, if he retreats back into empiricism and holds that moral
terms stand for abstract general ideas, he can apply his own critique
of abstract ideas to such terms and show them to be devoid of meaning, since they either involve contradiction or apply to no direct empirical referents, for we never meet "justice," but only just acts.
Lockian a priorism is rejected by Berkeley not simply because he
17 Included in Lord Peter King, Life and Letters of John Locke (London, 1858),
II, 125-127. Also cf. 129, sect. 9, quoted by R. I. Aaron in John Locke, 2nd ed.
(Oxford, 1955), 263.
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maintains that 'good,' for example, cannot be defined completely
apart from all contexts and that it does make a difference that some
just acts do really exist; but because, in large measure, of his developing views on the nature of self, or spirit.18 Several entries on
demonstration occur at the same place in the Commentaries where we
find remarks expressive of Berkeley's completed views on the nature
of spirit and there is, no doubt, a connection between the two sets of
thoughts. The acts of spirit cannot be known by ideas since ideas are
inert and cannot be like active things. These are known by notions.
If demonstration can be only of names which represent ideas and
ideas of spiritual activity are systematically unknowable and impossible, then moral demonstration is impossible inasmuch as morality is
a matter which primarily concerns the will, or volitions. "The opinion," declares Berkeley, "that men had Ideas of Moral actions has
render'd the Demonstrating Ethiques very difficult to them." 19 And
several entries earlier he also writes:
We have no Ideas of vertues & vices, no Ideas of Moral Actions wherefore
it may be Question'd whether we are capable of arriving at Demonstration
about them, the morality consisting in the Volition chiefly.20

Berkeley's insistence upon morality as a matter of the will, his
rejection of the meaningfulness of moral terms such as 'freedom,'
'good,' 'justice,' 'right,' 'obligation,' 'fortitude' and the like when
prescinded from all exemplifications of such qualities, and his denial
of any a priori demonstrability of ethics, by no means can be assumed
to be a dismissal of the use of reason in establishing moral precepts.
For Berkeley moral acts will have an element of rational calculation
within them. The goodness of an act is a quality perceived from the
effects of that act in a specific moral situation or context. It is a matter of present or future pleasure felt or to be felt. The rightness of an
act, however, is, Berkeley believes, a quality to be ascertained by the
"fitness" of that act to a universal rule of reason, and a rule governing actions done, being done, and to be done-acts of basic human
significance and import.
Bearing this in mind, the demand for relativism and reality in
ethics, it is surprising to know that in 1712 Berkeley composed a
treatise which seems to be a direct violation of his stand on demonstration. The question then arises as to whether his rationalist doctrine of the Passive Obedience can be reconciled with his sensate
eudaemonism. In actuality it cannot. The basic technique of the Passive Obedience is that very same demonstrative procedure which
18 The Berkeleian doctrine of spirits makes it increasingly clear that ideas of
moral actions are not possible; hence no demonstrability to ethics. Berkeley even
comes to question the possibility of the demonstration of ideas themselves.
19 Philosophical Commentaries, entry 683.
20 Ibid., entry 669.
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Berkeley dismissed in the Philosophical Commentaries and in the
Principles. Demonstration is of ideas and there are no positive ideas
of moral terms and moral acts strictly speaking. Berkeley had written
earlier in the Commentaries: "I must not to pretend much of Demonstration, I must cancell all passages that look like that sort of Pride,
that raising of Expectation in my Readers." 21 In the face of his many
strictures upon demonstration, he then writes a book on a demonstrative theory of ethics whose "eternal rules of action" have "the same
immutable universal truth with propositions in geometry." 22
This change of direction is puzzling. Yet if one realizes that Berkeley is here writing a treatise that is primarily political in nature and
only secondarily ethical, one can better understand the particular
problems. The ethical notions which Berkeley brings to bear on the
question of political loyalty are only extended and developed as far
as his immediate purpose required. Passive Obedience is not an attempt to work out an ethical system in whole or in brief.
The chief difficulty arising in the questions Berkeley discusses lies
in his meaning of 'negative moral precepts.' According to this treatise
those statements and precepts admit of no exceptions. In other words,
those precepts are such that they admit of no empirical or prudential
qualifications to men's unquestioned obedience of them. What kind of
propositions then could these be that would possess such a high degree
of certainty?
In attempting to find candidates for the appelation of 'negative
moral precepts,' one is ultimately driven to consider the Decalogue.
Therein we seem to find such candidates. Among these would be such
moral imperatives as "thou shalt not to steal," "thou shalt not murder," "thou shalt not commit adultery." If a negative moral precept
is defined as one which admits of no exception, then these sentences
qualify admirably. The reason why they so qualify is not because, as
a matter of fact, to transgress their admonitions would be wrong, but
because each is a tautology and says nothing. Each is necessarily true,
but true vacuously. 'Steal,' 'adultery,' and 'murder' are all words
which contain a built-in moral judgment. Each stands for a type of
wrong act. Therefore, when one says, 'one ought not to murder,' he is
only saying 'one ought not to engage in immoral killing.' Since what
is immoral is always wrong in matters of morals, this is no more
than saying 'one ought not to do what one ought not to do.' In these
cases it would seem that any validity the sentences have would have
to come (according to the demands of certainty) through revelation
rather than reason of the sort being used, or must be empirically
grounded as ultimately concerning the being and cohesion of some
kind of moral order of spirits.
21

Ibid., entry 858.

22

Passive Obedience, in Works, VI, 45.
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It is significant that Berkeley writes in the Philosophical Commentaries: "Reasoning there may be about things or Ideas or Actions
but Demonstration can only be verbal." 23 Reasoning for Berkeley can
never be abstract reasoning; it is always reasoning-cum-sense. In the
last analysis, the moral principles of the Passive Obedience are not
established by the type of demonstration of Locke nor by the kind of
rationalist argument one finds in Kant. His precepts on investigation
illustrate themselves to be empirical generalizations upon experience
or prudential maxims. He takes into account the feelings and inclinations of men. He starts from these and asks how they can be
harmonized with God's purposes which cannot be demonstrated but
which must come through revealed pronouncements to the common
man, to the philosophical man through an induction of particulars,
i.e. through seeing what courses of life, kinds of characters, and what
types of acts lead to men's real happiness.
By experience, our own as well as that of others we do see that
certain kinds of activities and lives seem to lead to observable consequences and we come to learn that the life of license will not pay off
in the long run except in debased coin. Pure ratiocination will not tell
us this; observation will give us a clue. As for finding the patterns of
conduct that will lead us to "the Happyness of the life to come," 24
that will have to come ultimately through an investigation of natural
and revealed religion. 25 It is a measure of Berkeley's realism on moral
issues that he realizes men are not won over to the practice of virtue
merely by increasing their power of abstract reasoning. He understands that most human beings must be won over to this conduct by
persuasion and education.
We may say that Berkeley ultimately abandoned demonstration
of moral matters for three reasons: (1) systematic: since morality
concerns actions, actions are not given through ideas, and only ideas
can be demonstrated (which is itself doubtful) ,26 moral truths are
incapable of being demonstrated; (2) psychological: the abstract nature of demonstration makes it difficult for the common man and is
incapable of providing him with motives for just acts. "In short the
dry strigose rigid way will not suffice, he must be more ample &
24 Ibid., entry 539.
Philosophical Commentaries, entry 804.
This will be largely a matter of revelation which will set the larger ends of
morality and leave to us the discovery of the means and types of acts necessary to
attain them. Revelation will not prescribe all the human duties, much will be left
to empirical considerations.
26 Berkeley eventually comes to hold that only names, rather than ideas strictly,
are demonstrable; hence all demonstration is merely verbal. Mathematics (excepting
geometry), being only about names or signs, is the demonstrative science par
excellence.
23

25
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copious else his demonstration 27 tho never so exact will not go down
wth most"; 28 (3) procedural: Berkeley is unwilling to divorce theory
completely from practice in human conduct.
Yet, Berkeley was not the only moralist of his age to abandon the
rationalistic and demonstrative approach to ethics in favor of an empirical consideration of its subject matter, the acts of men in concrete
situations. In the swing from the Platonic-Scholastic tradition, which
found its last great upholder in Locke, he was joined by his theological colleague and fellow bishop, Joseph Butler.
In his Ethical Sermons Butler maintained that the subject matter
of moral philosophy could be treated in either of two ways: from the
abstract relations of things apart from exemplifications in human
acts and from a study of the acts as they occur in life situations in
which the actor is the central figure for investigation. He also maintained that each method has its advantages and that each leads to
the practice of virtue. Butler probably had Samuel Clarke in mind
as the chief proponent of the former view and his contemporary the
Earl of Shaftesbury as representative of the latter method. His preference for the empirical method over the demonstrative appears to
be based on the wider appeal which a discussion of concrete moral
situations would have rather than upon any belief that the rationalist
method is in any way inadequate to its subject. Butler must be said
to have believed each of the two approaches to be valid. 29
Foreseeing and modern as were Butler's views, George Berkeley
went beyond him by completely rejecting demonstration and thereby
opened the way for a further reduction of the field of moral propositions, more of which he took simply as matters of fact. This he did in a
more thorough and polished way than Butler, Shaftesbury, or Mandeville who are often held up as precursors of David Hume in ethics.80
Thus Berkeley stands as the transitional figure between XVIIth-century rationalistic ethics and the empirical moral philosophy of the
XVIIIth, although his very position as a transitional figure has caused
his interest and merit as a moralist to go unacknowledged.
Eastern Washington College.
27 It is possible that Berkeley may occasionally be using demonstration in two
different senses: as a technical term and in the common usage of "to show or illustrate." This quotation could be employing the term in the latter way (Philosophical
Commentaries, entry 163). In this usage of 'demonstration' Alciphron would be the
"more ample & copious" method of offering proof on moral subjects.
2s Philosophical Commentaries, entry 163.
29 Joseph Butler, Analogy of Religion and the Fifteen Sermons (London, 1893).
In Author's Preface to Sermons, 372.
so Hume himself names "Mr. Locke, my Lord Shaftsbury, Dr. Mandeville, Mr.
Hutchinson, Dr. Butler," in the Introduction to the Treatise of Human Nature as
among "some late philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of
man on a new footing, and have engaged the attention, and excited the curiosity of
the public."

This content downloaded from 131.252.181.104 on Mon, 18 Apr 2016 21:16:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

